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Abstract 
 
As firms are increasingly more dependent on 
Information Technology (IT) for their business 
strategies and value creation activities, risks 
associated with IT become one of the top concerns for 
corporate boards and managers. This study examines 
the impact of IT-related risk factor disclosure in Item 
1A of the 10-K annual report on stock price crashes. 
We use Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to 
identify risk categories in risk disclosures between 
2006 and 2017. IT risk emerged as one of the key risk 
categories. We find that IT risk disclosure is positively 
correlated with a firm’s future stock price crash risk. 
We further separate IT risk factor disclosures into two 
categories: IT value risk that relates to a firm’s use of 
and reliance on information technology for its 
operations to reach its goals and objectives, and 
cybersecurity risk that could lead to a loss or leak of 
data. We find that while the correlation between cyber 
security risk disclosure and a firm’s future crash risk 
is significant, IT value risk disclosures do not have a 
significant correlation. 
 
1 Introduction 
Long considered as a strategic asset for 
organizations, information technology (IT) has 
become essential for the success and even survival of 
the firm. IT plays a significant strategic and 
operational role in businesses. It is, therefore, the key 
responsibility of management to manage the risks 
associated with information systems (IS) to minimize 
their negative consequences to the firm [1]–[3]. As 
publicly traded firms are required to disclose their IT 
risks along with the other risks that they are exposed 
to in their annual financial filings with the SEC, the 
question then arises as to whether these risk 
disclosures are important, and what the long-term 
impacts of these disclosures are to the firm. 
A considerable amount of research has 
examined the relation between IT failure events and its 
immediate market effects. Cavusoglu et al. [3] found 
that a cybersecurity breach costs a target firm on 
average $1.65 billion per announcement. Bharadwaj et 
al. [4] found that IT failures results in a 2% drop in 
stock prices over a two-day window. Viewing IT 
failure as a strategic weakness, Goldstein et al. [5] also 
found a negative stock price relation to the IT failures. 
On the contrary, Gordon et al. [6] found that 
information security announcements actually increase 
a firm’s stock prices, arguing that such disclosures 
signal active involvement by the firm in securing their 
IT assets. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there 
is no existing study in the IS literature that looks at the 
long-term effect of IT risk disclosures on the firm. 
Risk factor disclosures can hint at future firm 
performance degradations, but IT risk disclosure 
literature is sparse. Wang et al. [7] looked at IT 
security risk factors and its linkage to the realization 
of data breaches, but their dataset is limited to hand-
collected cybersecurity breach announcements in 
major media outlets and they do not look into the 
market impact of the risk disclosure itself. 
Furthermore, cybersecurity risks are not the only 
information technology related risks that a firm is 
exposed to. Yet, the existing literature predominantly 
focuses on cybersecurity.  
This paper aims to contribute to the risk 
factor disclosure literature by filling in the knowledge 
gap concerning the long-term effects of IT-related 
risks. Our primary research question is whether IT-
related risk factor disclosures affect a firm’s stock 
price crash risk, a long-term stock return measure. And 
if so, do cybersecurity and other IT risks differ in their 
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impact? To answer our research question we use topic 
modeling techniques to identify IT risk disclosures in 
Item 1A in 10-K filings. We use the resource 
weaknesses perspective from strategic management 
literature as a theoretical guide to categorize the IT risk 
disclosures into IT value and IT cybersecurity risk 
disclosures.  
We found that, consistent with our main 
hypothesis, IT risk factor disclosures are positively 
associated with the long-term stock price crash risk of 
the company. IT cybersecurity risk factors in particular 
were found to have a positive association with the 
crash risk, but IT value risk factors did not. 
 
2 Stock Price Crash Risk 
Our paper focuses on stock price crash risk, 
which captures the chances of extreme negative 
returns in a firm’s stock. Theoretically, stock price 
crashes are caused by managers withholding negative 
information about the firm and preventing that 
information from being made public. When the 
amount of negative information being stockpiled 
reaches a level that managers cannot withhold any 
longer, the bad news is released all at once, leading to 
a stock price crash [8]. The accounting literature 
investigates several determinants of crash risk, 
however, there is as yet no study that investigates the 
effect of IT risk factor disclosures on stock price crash 
risk. 
3 Hypothesis Development 
Given the important role of IS/IT plays in 
day-to-day business operations and overall firm 
strategy in any contemporary organization, failures in 
a firm’s IT adversely influence the firm’s ability to 
achieve its business objectives and gain a competitive 
advantage. In any firm, IS implementations are 
initiated to deliver business value to the firm. 
However, there is always a risk that the firm may not 
be able to gain the intended benefits from the IS/IT, 
and investors are keenly aware of the risks associated 
with IT [9]. There are many causes of this risk, 
including implementation challenges, unmanaged 
complexity (scope creep), IT governance issues, or 
poorly specified project requirements to name a few. 
As previous studies have shown, there are severe 
consequences to a firm’s stock price when IT risks 
materialize and an IT failure occurs [4], [5], [10]. 
 We argue that, if an existing IT system or a 
newly implemented IT project has a significant risk of 
failure to achieve its performance goals and to deliver 
value to the firm, managers will attempt to hide the 
information from outside investors for as long as 
possible to avoid damage to the firm’s value. This 
hoarding of bad news about the IT systems of a firm 
will eventually reach a tipping point, and the 
information will be released to the market all at once 
and induce a stock price crash. The bubble “bursting” 
can occur when investors recognize that the expected 
progress has not been achieved for ongoing projects or 
intended performance improvements have not been 
delivered for the existing IT. The bad news could also 
be revealed to the market if the IT risk is materialized 
(e.g. the firm experienced a data breach) or an IT 
failure occurs (e.g., the firm experienced an IS/IT 
related outage). In this way, IT risk factors can be 
viewed as an early indicator for future bad news 
announcements related to a firm’s information systems 
that cause stock price crashes. We postulate that, due 
to the requirements of the SEC to disclose any and all 
risk factors, IT-related risk factor disclosures in a 
firm’s 10-K would cut through the veil of opacity and 
reveal that the firm’s IS/IT may not deliver its intended 
business value or be well protected. Hence, we 
hypothesize:  
H1: IT-related risk factor disclosures are 
positively correlated with a firm’s stock price crash 
risk.  
As discussed previously, IT has an inherent 
risk in failing to deliver its full value to the firm. A 
firm’s inability to leverage its IT resource can cause 
the firm to fail to appropriate the intended value of IT, 
but not all IT failures can be explained through that 
theoretical lens. A firm can possess necessary 
competencies to implement IT systems successfully, 
derive value from its IT investments, and gain a 
competitive advantage as a result, while it may also 
fail to protect against cybersecurity attacks such as 
Denial-of-Service attacks. Additionally, a cyber attack 
may not always affect a firm’s ability to operate, 
especially if only a data breach is involved; the 
subsequent news of the breach will certainly 
temporarily affect the company’s market value and/or 
goodwill but will not affect the company’s ability to 
function.  
 We point out these two distinct modes of 
failure and risks, thus we break down IT risk into two 
types: IT cybersecurity risk and IT value risk. First, IT 
value risk is the risk that the firm will not be able to 
realize the full-intended value of the IT systems. This 
risk originates from the firm’s (lack of) skills and 
competencies in implementing and running an IT 
system and deriving its full-intended value. The lack 
of maturity in the firm’s IT strategy, governance, and 
management processes is often to blame. Second, IT 
cybersecurity risk is any risk that the confidentiality, 
availability, or integrity of a firm’s IT and data assets 
can be adversely affected, often through attacks from 
adversaries [11] and that causes harm to the firm’s 
business objectives either through negative press or a 
loss of function of the firm’s IT systems. Importantly, 
we differentiate the two types of IT risk based more so 
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on the sources of the risk rather than the impact on 
firm’s operations when the risk is materialized. 
  We theorize that IT value risk disclosures will 
reflect the firm’s inability to fully utilize their IT 
systems. That is, the more IT value risks the firm 
disclosures, the more informed the investors will be 
about the firm’s increasing inability to capture the full 
value from their IT systems and the more informed the 
investors will be about the state of the firm’s IS. The 
information that suboptimal IT/IS generates would be 
inaccurate, incomplete, or not timely. The managers 
and executives relying on the information from these 
systems would make suboptimal decisions, resulting 
in performance degradation and increasing the risk of 
a major stock price crash. Furthermore, as IS/IT is 
ingrained in all aspects of businesses, suboptimal IS/IT 
would cause inefficiencies in the business processes, 
resulting in further performance degradation. Thus, we 
postulate that:  
H1a: IT value risk disclosures are positively 
correlated with a firm’s stock price crash risk. 
Vulnerabilities in IS/IT that an organization 
possesses are liability for the firm. Malicious internal 
users and external hackers would exploit these 
vulnerabilities. We argue that IT cybersecurity risk 
disclosures will reflect the firm’s lack of protection for 
their IT assets from cybersecurity risks. That is, the 
more cybersecurity risks the firm disclosures, the more 
informed the investors will be about the firm’s 
increasing inability to protect its IT infrastructure and 
underlying key business data. Hence, we posit that:  
H1b: IT cybersecurity risk disclosures are 
positively correlated with a firm’s stock price crash 
risk. 
 
4 Data Collection 
We collect and analyze the data on U.S. 
publicly traded firms to examine the relationship 
between risk factor disclosure and stock price crash 
risk. We obtain risk factor disclosures from Item 1A of 
Form 10-K annual reports filed by publicly traded 
companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The SEC mandated companies to 
include Item 1A in their 10-K filings since December 
2005. Hence, our data sample includes 10-K filings 
submitted from December 2005 to July 2017. We 
collected 96,223 annual reports with reporting periods 
ranging from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2016. 
 To extract IT-related risk factor disclosures 
from the annual reports, we wrote a heuristic algorithm 
                                               
1  If a topic has the highest weight, the risk factor is 
considered to be related to the corresponding topic 
and that topic only. We used other cut-off values of 
that uses the HTML structure of a 10-K filing to 
identify and collect individual risk factors in Item 1A 
of the filing. Specifically, the algorithm parses the 
HTML filing and builds a Document Object Model 
(DOM) of the filing. Using this algorithm, we 
managed to extract 1.72 million risk factors from 
62,324 10-K filings. Overall, risk factors were 
extracted from 85.864.8% of all available 10-K filings 
in our sample period. 
  
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Risk Factor 
Disclosures in Item 1A that are IT Related for 
Years 2005 to 2017 
 
 
We use latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) [12] 
to extract 40 risk factor topics from our corpus of 1.72 
million risk factors. We used a model fitness statistic 
commonly used in the topic modeling literature called 
the perplexity score to tune our number of topics. We 
manually labeled the 40 topics according to the words 
with the highest word weights for each topic and 
identified one risk factor topic that was IT related. The 
LDA algorithm assumes a generative process through 
which each document in corpus was created. In 
particular, each document is characterized as random 
mixture over latent topics and each topic is 
characterized by a distribution over all the words in the 
corpus.  The LDA algorithm reverse engineers the 
generative process and results in document-topic 
distribution matrix and topic-word distribution matrix. 
Using the topic weights of each risk factor (i.e. a row 
in the first matrix)1, we identified 30,987 IT related 
risk factors. 
 
 Consistent with the strategic management 
literature [13] , our theory postulated that there are two 
distinct broad classes of IT-related risk. To identify IT 
0.05 and 0.1 (in which case a risk factor can have 
multiple topics) and our qualitative results have not 
changed. 
0.0%
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value and IT cybersecurity risk factor disclosures from 
10-K reports, we run another LDA again using the 
30,987 IT related risk factors as a corpus. We specified 
a 5-topic LDA model and manually mapped each topic 
to either IT value related or IT cybersecurity related 
according to the top keywords in the topic. Each IT 
risk factor was classified as an IT value risk factor or 
IT cybersecurity risk factor according to a simple 
majority of the sum of its topic weights belonging to 
IT value or IT cybersecurity, respectively, and we plot 
the proportion of IT value risk factors and IT 
cybersecurity risk factors disclosed per year in Figure 
2 below. 
 
Figure 2 Number of IT Cybersecurity Risk 
Factors and IT Value Risk Factors as a 
Percentage of Total IT-Related Risk Factor 
Disclosures  
 
 We obtain firm-related data from Compustat 
and stock return data from CRSP. After excluding 
observations with missing data, our final dataset 
includes 11,857 unique firms across 30,347 firm-year 
observations. 
 
5 Dependent and Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables are related to 
the risk disclosures. We used the topic of each risk 
factor disclosure found in the 10-K document to 
calculate the risk disclosure variables of interest for 
each firm year observation. Subscripts i and t denote 
the 10-K filing for firm i in year t. IT risk disclosure 
(i.e., ITRFDit) is the count of risk factors associated 
with the IT topic (i.e., topic 24), found in the 10-K 
filing for firm i in year t.  Each risk topic disclosure 
(i.e., 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()* where n Î [1,40]) is the count of risk 
factors associated with topic n. When the model of 
interest aims to disentangle the impacts of different 
classes of IT risk, we used IT risk topic assignment. In 
particular, IT value risk disclosure (i.e., 
ITPERFORMit) and IT cybersecurity risk disclosure 
(i.e., ITSECURITYit) are obtained as the counts of IT 
value risk factors and IT cybersecurity risk factors 
disclosed in the 10-K filing for firm i in year t. 
 Our dependent variable is CRASHit+1 and it 
refers to the stock price crash risk for the one-year 
window following firm i filing a 10-K in year t. 
Following prior studies on crash risk [8], [14]–[17], we 
use the negative skewness of abnormal daily stock 
return (i.e., NCSKEW) as our stock price crash risk 
measure. Theoretically, the use of negative skewness 
as a measure for stock price crash risk stems from the 
dual observation that large movements in the market 
tend to be negative rather than positive, giving stock 
returns a negative skew and that volatility tends to go 
up with negative returns. Additionally, high volatility 
leads to a high-risk premium, which impairs the 
impact of good news while enhancing the impact of 
bad news. Crash risk is linked to negative skewness 
based on the notion that volatility is a proxy for the 
intensity of investors’ disagreement about a firm and 
that during periods of high disagreement, bearish 
investors are likely to be at an information advantage 
[14]. We obtain control variables from Compustat and 
also include the number of total risk factors disclosed, 
NUMRFit, as a control variable as well as year and 
industry dummies. 
 
6 Model 
Our first hypothesis is intended to answer if 
IT risk factor disclosures in general have any 
correlation with a firm’s stock price crash risk. We run 
the following OLS regression model to test H1. 
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + 𝛽/𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐹𝐷() + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +	𝜖() (1) 
 
where ITRFDit is the count of IT-related risk factor 
disclosures found in Item 1A for firm i in fiscal year t, 
and CRASHit+1 refers to our crash risk measure.  
Controls includes the following control 
variables for determinants of crash risk identified in 
previous studies: firm size for firm i at the fiscal year-
end t, SIZEit; book-to-market ratio for firm i at the 
fiscal year-end t, BMit; stock return momentum for 
firm i in the fiscal year-end t, MOMit; abnormal trading 
volume for firm i in the fiscal year-end t, ABVOLit; 
stock return volatility of volume for firm i in the fiscal 
year t, SIGMAit; leverage ratio of firm i at the fiscal 
year-end t, LEVit; return over assets for firm i in the 
fiscal year t, ROAit; earnings volatility for firm i in the 
fiscal year t, ROA_STDit; operating cycle of firm i in 
the fiscal year t, OCit; and sales growth of for firm i in 
the fiscal year t, SGit. In all regressions, we also 
include in our controls dummies for industry using the 
Fama-French 12 industry classification and dummies 
for fiscal years 2005 to 2016. When the aim is to 
disentangle impacts of different classes of IT related 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2005 2010 2015
IT Security
IT Value
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risk disclosures and stock price crash risk, we used the 
following OLS regression model:   
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + 𝛽/𝐼𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀() +𝛽?𝐼𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌() 	+ 𝛽B𝐼𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀() ∗𝐼𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +	𝜖()                           (2) 
 
where ITPERFORMit and ITSECURITYit refer to the 
measures for IT value risk disclosure and 
cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in Item 1A of a 10-
K annual report for firm i in fiscal year t, respectively. 
We used the same Controls and CRASH in Equation 
(1). 
 
7 Results 
7.1 Effects of IT Risk Factor Disclosure 
 
Table 1. Effects of IT Risk Disclosure on 
Stock Price Crashes 
 Coefficient [t-stat] 
Intercept 0.630 [4.75]*** 
ITRFD  0.069 [6.52]*** 
SIZE 0.007 [0.91] 
BM 0.060 [3.72]*** 
MOM -0.409 [-6.55]*** 
SIGMA -7.875 [-5.70]*** 
ABVOL 0.003 [2.39]** 
ROA -0.147 [-2.10]** 
ROA_STD 0.000 [6.32]*** 
LEV -0.017 [-0.26] 
SG 0.000 [-0.74] 
OC 0.000 [-0.03] 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
Obs. 30347 
R2 0.0445 
 
H1 is concerned with whether IT risk factor 
disclosures in general have any effect on a firm’s stock 
price crash risk. To test this, we regressed the number 
of IT-related risk factors disclosed against the crash 
risk measures following Equation (1). We run the 
regression on the crash risk measure (i.e., 
NCSKEWit+1). The regression results are found in 
Error! Reference source not found. and show that 
IT-related risk factor disclosures are significantly 
positively related to stock price crash risk for the one-
year window following the release of a 10-K annual 
report. The coefficient (t-statistic) for ITRFDit is 0.069 
(6.52). 
One concern might be that the result that IT 
related risk factor disclosure is associated the higher 
stock price crash risk can be affected by the other risk 
factor disclosures. As a robustness check, we ran the 
same regression but included the counts of the other 39 
risk factor topics into the model specified in (1). That 
is: 
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻()./ = 𝛽2 + ∑ 𝛽*𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()*E2*F/ +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +	𝜖() (3) 
 
where 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()* refers to the count of risk factors of 
topic n for firm i in year t. 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝐶()?E is equivalent 
to ITRFDit. The regression results are found in Table 2 
and show that the significant coefficient in Model (1) 
reported in Table 1 remained significant even after 
controlling for all other risk factor topics. 
 
Table 2. Effects of All Risk Disclosure types 
on Stock Price Crashes  
 Coefficient [t-stat] 
Intercept 0.666 [4.85]*** 
RFTOPIC1  0.042 [3.85]*** 								⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
RFTOPIC24 (ITRFD) 0.058 [4.66]*** 								⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
RFTOPIC40 -0.008 [-0.88] 
SIZE 0.004 [0.56] 
BM 0.067 [4.04]*** 
MOM -0.407 [-6.49]*** 
SIGMA -8.223 [-5.80]*** 
ABVOL 0.002 [1.89]* 
ROA -0.144 [-1.97]** 
ROA_STD 0.000 [6.75]*** 
LEV -0.034 [-0.46] 
SG 0.000 [-0.42] 
OC -0.004 [-0.25] 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
Obs. 30347 
R2 0.0627 
 
7.2 Cybersecurity and IT Value Risk 
Disclosures 
To examine the relation between IT risk 
disclosures on stock price crash risk more closely, we 
look at IT value risk disclosures and IT cybersecurity 
risk disclosures separately and measure their effect on 
a firm’s stock price crash risk. We followed Equation 
(2) in regressing the number of IT cybersecurity and 
IT value risks disclosed against the stock price crash 
risk and the results are reported in Table 3. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) for ITSECURITYit is 0.051 
(2.20), indicating that IT cybersecurity related 
disclosures are significantly and positively correlated 
with a firm’s stock price crash risk in the one year 
following such a disclosure. However, the coefficient 
for ITPERFORMit is not significant. This is not in line 
with our theoretical expectation.  
We believe that differential effects can be 
explained by how much risks are within the control of 
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the companies. Since IT value creation is within the 
purview of the leadership and management teams of 
the companies, the market can interpret the IT value 
risk as a risk of doing business. This is also consistent 
with organizational errors notion of [18] that avoiding 
an organizational error is “a hygiene or parity factor” 
not a source of competitive advantage. Since cyber 
security is often characterized as an arm race between 
security practitioners and malicious actors [19], even 
if the organization investments in security 
technologies to bring the cyber risk to an acceptable 
level, the ability of the firm to deal with the constantly-
evolving vulnerabilities and attack vectors deteriorates 
very quickly. Therefore, cybersecurity risk disclosure 
can be viewed as an admission of deteriorating 
conditions of the cybersecurity risks that the firm is 
exposed to beyond the acceptable level.  
 
Table 3. Effects of IT Value Risk Disclosure 
and IT Security Risk Disclosure on Stock 
Price Crashes  
 Coefficient [t-stat] 
Intercept 0.627 [4.76]*** 
ITPERFORM 0.032 [0.86] 
ITSECURITY 0.051 [2.20]** 
ITPERFORM*ITSECURITY -0.028 [-0.82] 
SIZE 0.008 [1.08] 
BM 0.053 [3.29]*** 
MOM -0.411 [-6.56]*** 
SIGMA -8.049 [-5.81]*** 
ABVOL 0.003 [2.51]*** 
ROA -0.130 [-1.85]* 
ROA_STD 0.000 [5.79]*** 
LEV -0.081 [-1.23] 
SG 0.000 [-0.89] 
OC -0.009 [-0.62] 
NUMRF 0.004 [4.90]*** 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
Obs. 30347 
R2 0.0434 
 
8 Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the long-term effect 
of IT-related risk factor disclosures in 10-K filings. 
We documented that IT cybersecurity disclosures 
specifically have a significant relation with a firm’s 
crash risk in the one-year window after the disclosure. 
This result supports but does not prove the notion that 
IT risk factors reflect the liability of a firm, which later 
materializes as an IT failure/issue that causes a severe 
stock price drop. Altogether, we provided supporting 
empirical evidence that risk disclosures are not 
boilerplate and contain relevant information about a 
firm’s long-term performance. This study also 
advanced our understanding by separating IT-related 
risk into two categories – IT value risk and IT 
cybersecurity risk – and shows that the latter type of 
risk disclosure is associated with stock price crashes. 
We also make methodological contributions by 
providing a framework for conducting textual analysis 
on risk factors contained in 10K annual reports and by 
providing Java and Python source code to aid future 
researchers in extracting risk factors. 
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